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Human Element: Cyber Security Starts Here. 
Cybersecurity professionals agree that that security depends on people more than on technical 
controls and countermeasures. Recent reviews of the cyber security threat landscape show 
that no industry segment is immune to cyber-attacks and the public sector tops the list for 
targeted security incidents (Benson, 2017). This is largely attributed to the weaker cyber 
security mindset of employees. On the other hand, the financial sector year on year 
experiences the highest volume of cyber breaches aimed at financial gain or espionage. What 
is common between these rather different sectors is that the attack vector by cyber criminals 
starts with social engineering the weakest link in their security chain. With the continuous 
loss of control over personal information exposed online (Benson et al., 2015) individuals 
present easy targets for non-technical attacks ranging from spear-fishing to whaling leading 
on to serious cyber victimisation.   
 
Though human behaviour in online contexts has been addressed by researchers for some 
time, the cybersecurity industry, policymakers, law enforcement, public and private sector 
organizations are yet to realise the impact individual cyber behaviour has on security. It is 
important that this gap is addressed. A secure system is one which behaves in a predictable 
and rationale way; however as demonstrated by psychological research human behaviour and 
decision-making processes are multifaceted and often unpredictable. In order to improve 
cybersecurity practices there is a need for discussion that acknowledges that cybersecurity is 
inherently a complex socio-technical system. This concept is not new in psychological 
research.  Indeed in 1951 Trist and Bamforth proposed the idea that changes to a 
technological system must be complemented by changes to social systems.  To do one 
without the other could result in a systems failure.  If one is concerned about cyber security, 
the human element must be investigated in depth. If the human element is not considered 
where human behaviour is involved, the system is doomed to failure before it begins.  
To gain better insights in addressing evolving challenges of the digital world, Cybersecurity 
increasingly relies on advances in human behaviour research. Whilst technology may often 
form the core of cyber-attacks, these incidents are instigated and responded to by humans. As 
demonstrated in recent cybersecurity breaches, such as the WannaCry ransomware affecting 
150 countries, cybersecurity incidents exploit the human element. Cyber threats are 
 
 
increasingly choosing psychological manipulation, known as social engineering, rather than 
hacking in the traditional technical sense.  To effectively integrate technology with the human 
element, a number of fields can be looked to for guidance.  The military and intelligence 
community have been dealing with this for some time; banking and financial industries as 
well.  Both use aspects of psychology and the human element to better detect fissures in 
security. If we were to ignore basic psychological research would be doing a disservice to the 
cybersecurity field.  Understanding decision making, vigilance, and sheer convenience which 
undoubtedly play a role in security are essential features to understanding how to keep 
ourselves safe in an increasingly cyber world. Making sure that the way that employees think 
about keeping company data secure should match habit and personality style.  Requiring 
frequent password changes may not be an effective strategy as people are less likely to do 
that then come up with a single intricate password that they use for a year.  Thinking about 
matching the behaviours with the person is an effective strategy, we look into aligning theory 
to existing experiences in order to answer the following questions: 
1) Can psychological manipulation of a cyber victim be countered by technical controls? 
– current threats mitigation measures try to establish ‘expected’ user profiles and 
identify unusual behaviours.  
2) Can lapses in decision making have a measured impact on organisational and 
individual vigilance? – establishing metrics around appropriate decision making can 
help reflect preparedness of organisations towards cyber-attacks, including those 
manipulating employees.    
3) Will cultural differences and beliefs eventually lead to idiosyncratic cyber security 
mechanisms? – cyber security solutions, including authentication and detection 
mechanisms, follow a one-size-fit-all paradigm leading to varied effectiveness.  
4) Can cybersecurity be better explained through the lens of a complex socio-technical 
system? – viewing a secure system as one which behaves in a predictable and 
rationale way creates issues when a human element is introduced into consideration. 
5) What are the emerging ways to address the weaknesses of human behaviour? – 
achieving the secure state of mind requires more than technical countermeasures 
which rely not only on fear but on individual and collective human strengths. 
The fight against cyber threats never stops and can be viewed as an arms race between 
malicious and benign actors. New areas have emerged in the field, such as the growth of 
commercial crimeware, the proliferation of open source hacking tools and social media 
enabled social engineering strategies which are worthy of attention. While for some cyber 
psychology is seen as a new way of doing old things, others highlight how differences in 
online behaviour warrant new methodological approaches to cyber security. For instance, the 
perceived anonymity and disinhibition effect offered by the internet is known to change 
human behaviour in several ways, such as altering perceptions of risk and willingness to 
engage in criminal behaviour.  
We are in it together.  
We also need to consider not just the interaction between the individual and the machine, but 
also how the interaction between individuals shape their cybersecurity attitudes and 
behaviours. Individuals do not operate in a social vacuum; the actions of the attackers and the 
response of the targets are in part determined by the social worlds in which they operate.  
 
 
People will tend to alter their thoughts and behaviours to match the groups to which they 
belong (Kelman, 2006), which can include social groups, workplace group or groups of 
cybercriminals and hacktivists. Furthermore, emotions can spread throughout groups, even to 
individuals who were not involved in the incident that prompted the initial emotional 
response (Smith, Seger, & Mackie, 2007). In the case of hacktivism this may result in 
hacktivists engaging in attacks as a form of protest against targets that they have negative 
feelings towards, regardless of whether they have personally been affected by the actions of 
the target. In the case of employees within a company their response to cybersecurity threats 
may be influenced by the fear or stress experienced by colleagues who have fallen victim to 
attack such as phishing emails. In addition, the natural response of a company that has been 
the victim of a cyber-attack may be to hold group discussions about best to react. This is not 
surprising; after all humans have evolved as social creatures and we tend to draw closer 
together when our group is threatened. Yet it also known from psychological research that 
groups often make riskier decisions than an individual would alone (Wallach, Kogan, & Bem, 
1962). This may apply not only to the targets of the attack but also the attackers, with both 
groups behaving in a riskier and possibly ultimately more damaging manner than they would 
have done as individuals. However, it has also been demonstrated within social psychological 
research that we often underestimate the extent to which we are influenced by those around 
us (Darley, 1992). This is an example of the type of irrationality and cognitive biases that can 
make the prediction of human behaviour especially challenging; not only may we 
misinterpret the behaviours and intentions of others we may fail to be aware of the factors 
that determine our own behaviour. A better understanding of how social processes influence 
the actions of all of the actors involved in a cybersecurity incident would improve threat 
prediction and help determine how to manage and optimise the response of the targets. 
The importance of social norms and group identity vary between culture, ranging from those 
that value collectivism and acting for the good of the group to those which are individualistic 
and promote the success of the individual. Nevertheless, even in individualistic cultures such 
as the UK and USA a degree of interdependence with others is unavoidable. People working 
within an organisation have trust one another not to expose the organisation to cybersecurity 
threats through for example the opening of phishing emails. They place trust in IT services to 
protect them from cyber-attack, and in doing so may relegate their sense of responsibility for 
all computer related matters. Of course, this trust in IT services may be misplaced trust. As 
commented previously there is a limit to protection can be provided by technology if an 
individual persists in engaging in risky cyber behaviours. This relates to another well-known 
social psychological phenomenon known as diffusion of responsibility, in which individuals 
fail to take appropriate action, even in the face of impending danger, because they assume 
that others around them will act (Darley & Latané, 1968). These issue of trust and 
interdependence are not limited to the victims of cyber-attacks. Cybercrime is often a group 
exercise. Perpetrators rely on the skills and abilities of others to commit attacks, which 
requires the development and maintenance of trust. The importance of trust in such situations 
is arguably even more pertinent in cybercriminal gangs than in the victims they target. A 
betrayal by a group member may expose other group members to arrest and prosecution. The 
revelation that a member of the hacktivist collective Anonymous was an FBI informant could 
be argued to have caused more disruption within the group than did the efforts of their 
adversaries to dispel them.  It is essential to explore these issues of group processes, trust and 
 
 
social identity, and how these influence the decision-making processes of individuals and 
groups within socio-technical systems.  
Emerging mitigation measures. 
Psychologists have studied a range of topics about human behaviour and these findings must 
be applied to the cyber world to effectively keep people and their data secure. First, people 
within organisations need to be aware of the risks of cyber breaches and take them seriously.  
Research found that if someone has experienced a cyber threat, or has perceived such a 
threat, they are more likely to be vigilant (Chen & Zahedi, 2016). But, there may be ways to 
enhance vigilance before it comes to perceived or experienced threat.  Gamification may be 
one way forward. 
Users need to take steps to protect themselves and the data they are responsible for.  Attitude 
may play a role.  Being positive about the working environment could go a long way in 
increasing employee attentiveness to breaches. Trying to quell those who are disengaged with 
their offices or disgruntled employees who want to target the company are a worry. 
Corporations and employees must be vigilant and not let naivety at best and laziness or 
dissatisfaction with the work environment at worst come to the fore.   
Behavioural nudge (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008) is another method to help ensure that company 
insiders are aware of the pitfalls of negligence to the very real risks of cyber breaches. 
Psychologists and other behaviourists have been using the concept of nudge for several years 
to see how it may help in altering a number of behaviours.  Using these concepts for 
cybersecurity could be beneficial in eliciting more vigilant behaviours.  Asking, and showing, 
employees how they could be responsible for security is essential. Changing risk taking or 
lackadaisical approaches could be done through nudge and yield behavioural change.  If the 
corporations are expected to be responsible for cybersecurity and employees rely on that, 
there could be a breakdown in security.  Creating awareness of how protection needs to be 
done by all users, especially in light of the incoming General Data Protection Regulations 
(GDPR) in May 2018, is a step in the right direction. 
It will be interesting to see if the new GDPR alters the way companies deal with data 
protection and cybersecurity. Psychology can help with predictions as to whether the 
financial penalties that will be placed on companies make them more diligent.  Or GDPR 
might encourage the company to nurture behaviour change on the part of its employees. It is 
believed that most people want to do the right thing so by using the regulations, nudge and by 
playing on aspects of personality, perhaps there will be positive changes in corporations and 
its employees working together to elicit secure cyber environments.  
With the increasing global cyber dependency, international cyber security is not a uniform 
notion.  In this respect aspects of psychological research show how an understanding of 
human behaviour can impact on keeping cyber systems secure.  By considering the cultural 
contexts, maliciousness, personality and other such features of human behaviour, there are 
avenues to explore the intersection between cybersecurity and behaviour.   
It is useful to review crime research as some aspects of cybercrime are similar or the same as 
more traditional forms of crime using new methods.  Encrypting data through ransomware 
and requiring users to pay to have their data released is old fashioned extortion.  Findings into 
how to deter extortion and other crimes like it may help to reduce the number of cyber 
 
 
breaches. Tapping into the psychology of fear may also help the victims understand what 
they are experiencing and how to cope with the infringement.  
 Concluding remarks. 
We started the discussion of key questions on psychological manipulation countermeasures 
and how organisational and individual vigilance can be affected by individual and collective 
decision making. We feel that much more research attention is necessary to help develop 
effective cyber security culture and address risk taking behavioural challenges.  
We identified the challenges of globalisation in developing security technical solutions and 
opened the discussion on how culture, religion and social norms can impact controls 
effectiveness and taken into account when addressing the issues of cyber terrorism, 
propaganda and online radicalisation.  
Evolving cyber threats warrant emerging ways to combat them; we see novel approaches to 
cyber security training, including gamification, nudging and attitude changing experiences, as 
the new methods facilitating collective appreciation of security objectives.  
One final thought is about conducting research into cyber behaviour of individuals. As the 
access to data on individual digital behaviour has improved over the recent years, ethical 
questions became opaque. For instance, preserving anonymity of online research subjects 
presents issues of data ‘scrubbing’ and makes inferring identity straightforward. New 
methods are needed to ethically engage with individual users without exposing them to 
information breaches as shown in examples of NHS and AWS data sets exposures.  As the 
cyber security landscape continuously changes, so are the challenges for cyber security 
researchers requiring agility in identifying counter mechanisms and innovation in 
understanding human decision-making.  
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